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The ability to keep track of time is perceived as crucial in most human societies.
However, to lose track of time may also serve an important social role, associated with
recreational purpose. To this end a number of social technologies are employed, some
of which may relate to a manipulation of time perception through a modulation of body
representation. Here, we investigated an influence of real-time or delayed videos of own-
body representations on time perception in an experimental setup with virtual mirrors.
Seventy participants were asked to either stay in the installation until they thought that
a defined time (90 s) had passed, or they were encouraged to stay in the installation as
long as they wanted and after exiting were asked to estimate the duration of their stay.
Results show that a modulation of body representation by time-delayed representations
of the mirror-video displays influenced time perception. Furthermore, these time-delayed
conditions were associated with a greater sense of arousal and intoxication. We suggest
that feeding in references to the immediate past into working memory could be the
underlying mental mechanism mediating the observed modulation of time perception.
We argue that such an influence on time perception would probably not only be achieved
visually, but might also work with acoustic references to the immediate past (e.g., with
music).
Keywords: time perception, body schema, visual delay, virtual mirror, flow, intoxication
Introduction
Body representation and sense of time in humans seem to be closely related. Previous research
showed that several physiological parameters such as heart rate (Wittmann, 2013) and body tem-
perature (Wearden and Penton-Voak, 1995) modulate the way we perceive time. Also, the mental
representation of one’s own body, the body schema, seems to play an inﬂuential role in the subjec-
tive perception of time. Body schema has been deﬁned as the “mental construct that comprises the
sense impressions, perceptions, and ideas about the dynamic organization of one’s own body and its
relations to that of other bodies” (Berlucchi and Aglioti, 1997). The perception of body schema can
be modiﬁed by a variety of means (Holmes and Spence, 2006). An established method to achieve
this is in an experimental setting where visual feedback is presented via mirrors or video monitors
(Holmes and Spence, 2004; Bernardi et al., 2013).
Such manipulations of body schema can be employed to create proprioceptive/sensory changes
and illusions such as, for example, the rubber hand illusion (Holmes and Spence, 2007), and out-
of-body experiences (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). A manipulation of body schema, however, also
seems to relate to recreational experiences that are associated with an altered perception of time.
For example, the consumption of cannabis has been shown to aﬀect both bodily representation
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and sense of time (Edelmann and Terbuyken, 2002; Atakan et al.,
2012). Methods not related to intoxication, such as meditating,
that employ changes in the monitoring of body schema have
also been shown to have—among other psychological eﬀects—an
eﬀect on the perception of time (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013).
Likewise, the subjective experience of ﬂow (a psychological state
associated with high motivation and either motor or cognitive
challenge) that often corresponds to a change in bodily experi-
ence appears to be associated with a modiﬁed perception of time
(cf. Jackson and Csikszentmihaly, 1999).
Further evidence for a relation of body schema and time
perception derives from schizophrenia research. Schizophrenia
patients, who have been found to display a diﬀerent body repre-
sentation schema (Thakkar et al., 2011), showed greater variabil-
ity with regard to their performance in a timing task and impaired
ability to estimate time (Peterburs et al., 2013; Bolbecker et al.,
2014).
Taken together, previous ﬁndings strongly suggest an associ-
ation of one’s own body representation and one’s perception of
time, so that a modulation of own body representation might
aﬀect the ability to accurately estimate time. In order to fur-
ther investigate this relationship, we designed an experiment in
which we manipulated bodily representations via delayed and
non-delayed virtual mirrors. Because variables such as sex and
age have been shown in the past to be associated with the per-
ception of time, they were assessed to identify possible inﬂuences
as well as moderator or mediator eﬀects (Perbal et al., 2002;
Glicksohn and Hadad, 2012).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Seventy individuals (39 females, age 30.01± 14.21, range: 11–67)
took part in the experiment. Required minimal age to take part
in the study was 10 years. Participants gave their written consent
and did not receive any compensation.
Procedure
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four groups.
There were two experimental groups (aware delayed and non-
aware delayed) and two control groups (aware not delayed and
non-aware not delayed). We used a 2x2 design with delayed
videos vs. non-delayed videos of body representations as one
factor, and time-awareness vs. no time-awareness1 as the other.
In both the delay conditions, participants were presented with
visual delayed videos of themselves, while in the two non-delayed
groups videos were shown in real-time. Individuals were addi-
tionally assigned to one of the two “time-awareness” conditions
(aware delay: n = 19; aware no delay: n = 20). In the aware-
ness conditions they were instructed to enter the installation and
return after they assumed 90 s to be over. Participants in the “no
1Note that “time awareness” should be understood as relative to the non-awareness
conditions, i.e., pointing to increased attention dedicated to time by participants
compared to participants assigned to the no time-awareness conditions. This is due
to the fact that we did not employ a control task that made sure that participants
were constantly focusing on the passage of time in the time-awareness conditions.
time-awareness” conditions (not aware delay: n = 16; not aware
no delay: n = 15) were asked to enter the installation and stay
there as long as they wanted. Prior to the experiment participants
were instructed to ﬁll out a questionnaire that also included con-
structs such as Situational Self-Awareness, Attentional Resource
Allocation, Time Perspective, and Impulsiveness. Because the
current paper aims to focus on a relation of body representa-
tion and time perception, results of these measurements are not
reported here. Afterward, participants were asked to leave their
timekeepers (i.e., cell phones, watches) with the experimenter
for the duration of their stay in the experimental installation
(Figure 1), allegedly in order to avoid distraction.
How long each participant stayed in the installation was unob-
trusively measured by the experimenter. All participants received
a post-experimental questionnaire including measures of arousal,
perceived intoxication, subjective experience of changes in time,
and several other scales not relevant to the current study, as well
as some demographic questions.
A video signal was recorded by a camera installed above one
of the eight video screens. This signal was then transferred to a
media-server computer. A software (Wings Vioso, Duesseldorf,
Germany) allowed to systematically delay the video signal and
output eight diﬀerent delayed versions (1–4 s) of the video signal
during the delay condition. Groups of two outputs were trans-
mitted to one of four beamers that projected the video signals on
back projection screens (one on each of two screens), so that the
participants could see the eight diﬀerent visual presentations on
all eight screens without artifacts (e.g., shadows).
Data Analysis
Estimation error was computed in the awareness conditions as
the measured duration of stay in the installation minus 90 s and
in the no awareness conditions as the measured duration of stay
minus the estimate of duration of stay by participants. Similar
to previous research on human time estimation or production,
we used absolute estimation error as an indicator of magnitude
of estimation error, which is irrespective of its direction (Pastor
et al., 1992; Rammsayer, 1997; Barkley et al., 2001a,b; Kerns et al.,
2001). Further, following the procedures of Bauermeister et al.
(2005), we applied logarithmic transformation on absolute esti-
mation errors, i.e., estimation error plus 1 was computed and
log-transformed, to reduce skewness of our data and to bring the
raw absolute values more in line with the assumptions of para-
metric statistics. Because it was not possible to directly investigate
diﬀerences between signed estimation errors due to properties of
data distribution, we computed transformed signed estimation
errors by adding the highest negative estimation error (195 s) to
get positive values. In order to reach a normal distribution these
values were squared afterwards. In order to compute eﬀects on
the direction of estimation errors, estimation errors greater than
0 s were coded as an overestimation of duration, and an error
below 0 s was coded as an underestimation of duration.
The variables age and duration of stay were split into two sec-
tions by their median, i.e., younger vs. older age and long vs.
short duration of stay. The cut-oﬀ for high vs. low arousal was
deﬁned as the value of three on the administered 6-point scale.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental installation “Kaleidoscope of Time.” The participant enters the installation through a small staircase and stands on a tower, where
eight video screens are visible that show video recordings/representations of him/her. Beamers projecting the video signals on back projection screens were
positioned on the four columns in the periphery of the installation.
Parametric computations (i.e., ANOVA, independent samples t-
test) were used when requirements were met by the data. If basic
assumptions were violated, non-parametric computations (i.e.,
Kruskal–Wallis test, Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test, U-test) were
employed.
Measures
Arousal
Experienced arousal was measured by means of the one-item Felt
Arousal Scale (FAS; Svebak and Murgatroyd, 1985). Participants
had to indicate their arousal on a 6-point scale with 1 indicating
“low arousal” and six indicating “high arousal.” This measure of
arousal or activation was found to correlate with other arousal
scales ranging from 0.45 to 0.70, and thus showed convergent
validity (Sheppard and Parﬁtt, 2008).
Intoxication
Participants indicated their perception of intoxication assessed
by the question “Wie ‘berauscht’ fühlen Sie sich im Moment?”
(“How ‘intoxicated’ do you feel at the moment?”) on a 4-point
Likert scale with 1 indicating “not at all” and four indicating “very
much.”
Subjective Changes in Sense of Time
Subjectively experienced changes in sense of time were assessed
by the subdimension of “time sense” of the Phenomenology
of Consciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala et al., 1986). The
overall measure was shown to have suﬃcient reliability and
validity for assessing changes in phenomenological experience
(Pekala et al., 1986). The subdimension used in this study
consists of three items, each comprising two opposing state-
ments. Participants rated the statements on a 5-point scale,
indicating with which of the two statements they agreed more,
e.g., a rating of three indicating equal agreement with both
statements. Sample item: “Time seemed to greatly speed up
or slow down” vs. “Time was experienced with no changes
in its rate of passage.” In our study, Cronbach’s alpha was
α = 0.83.
Other Outcomes and Controls
The experiences of feeling detached from one’s body and of “sink-
ing into pictures” were assessed by single items constructed for
the purpose of this study. These items were rated on a 4-point
Likert scale ranging from “not at all” to “completely.” For the
assessment of subjectively experienced waste of time the item “In
your honest opinion, do you think this survey was a waste of
time?” was used (O’Brien et al., 2011). In addition, participants
in the time-awareness conditions were asked if they used count-
ing to estimate time correctly. Finally, data on age and sex were
collected.
Results
We constructed a general linear model (GLM), including the
variables group, duration of stay (long vs. short), age (younger
vs. older) and sex. In addition, we modeled interactions between
sex × group, age × group, and duration of stay × group. Group
was found to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on log-transformed esti-
mation error, F(3,53) = 3.36, p = 0.025, η2 = 0.160. Moreover,
a signiﬁcant interaction existed between duration of stay and
group, F(3,53) = 4.67, p = 0.006, η2 = 0.209. No signiﬁcant
main eﬀects were observed for sex, F(1,53) = 3.13, p = 0.083,
η2 = 0.056, duration of stay, F(1,53) = 0.08, p = 0.781, and age,
F(1,53) = 0.05, p = 0.831. Further no signiﬁcant interactions
existed between sex and group, F(3,53) = 1.20, p = 0.319 or age
and group, F(3,53)= 0.83, p= 0.485. The overall corrected model
accounted for 42.8% of variance, F(15,53) = 2.65, p = 0.005 (for
mean and standard deviation see Table 1).
Due to the non-normality of data, W(69) = 0.945, p = 0.005,
and inhomogeneity of variances, no ANOVA or Kruskal–Wallis
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TABLE 1 | Mean and standard deviation of absolute time estimation errors (log-transformed and non-transformed) for experimental and control groups.
Experimental group Log-transformed absolute estimation error Absolute estimation error in s
Duration of stay
Short Long Total Short Long Total
Aware delay 1.41 (0.23) 0.95 (0.51) 1.24 (0.42) 28.50 (16.03) 13.29 (14.40) 22.89 (16.82)
Aware no delay 1.49 (0.24) 1.34 (0.46) 1.42 (0.35) 33.64 (15.97) 34.33 (35.91) 33.95 (26.03)
Not aware delay 1.31 (0.37) 1.85 (0.39) 1.61 (0.46) 24.71 (15.86) 90.00 (56.30) 61.44 (53.95)
Not aware no delay 1.29 (0.28) 1.50 (0.31) 1.38 (0.30) 23.00 (18.59) 37.83 (29.93) 29.36 (24.26)
Overall 1.39 (0.27) 1.43 (0.52) 1.41 (0.40) 28.13 (16.38) 46.59 (47.59) 36.35 (35.06)
test could be performed to detect possible eﬀects of group on
means of estimation error. A Welch test computed on the basis
of the transformed signed estimation error did not yield any sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between groups, W(3,32)= 0.690, p = 0.565.
However, the descriptive pattern of group means of estimation
error is shown in Figure 2. The overall mean of estimation error
was M = −12.75, SD = 49.04. A Kruskal–Wallis test did not
yield any diﬀerences on the duration of stay between groups,
χ2 = 1.880, p= 0.598.
No signiﬁcant eﬀect was found of groups on the direction of
estimation error, i.e., overestimation vs. underestimation, χ2(3,
n = 69) = 6.433, p = 0.0922. Furthermore, a Chi-Square test
revealed neither signiﬁcant diﬀerences between gender and direc-
tion of estimation error, χ2(1, n = 69) = 0.122, p = 0.727, nor
between age groups and direction of estimation error (age < 25
vs. age > 24), χ2(1, n = 69) = 0.349, p = 0.555. Additionally,
an ANOVA yielded no eﬀect of perceived waste of time (three
2Bonferroni–Holm corrected alpha level: α’ = 0.0167.
groups) by subjects on log-transformed absolute estimation error,
F(2,66)= 0.454, p= 0.637.
With regard to subjective changes in the perception of time,
we found that groups diﬀered signiﬁcantly on the degree of per-
ceived changes in time sense, χ2(3, n = 70) = 8.674, p = 0.034.
According to ranks, participants of the aware delayed group expe-
rienced the strongest subjective changes in the passage of time,
followed by the aware no delay and not aware delay groups.
Participants in the not aware no delay group reported the lowest
changes in time sense.
Further, a Mann–Whitney U-test showed a signiﬁcant eﬀect
of delay condition (delay or no delay) on the feeling of arousal,
U = 387,500, p= 0.0093, on perceived intoxication, U = 338.500,
p = 0.0134, and a marginal eﬀect on the experience of ‘sink-
ing into the pictures,’ U = 444.500, p = 0.0385. It did not have
an eﬀect on feeling detached from one’s body, U = 468.000,
3Bonferroni–Holm corrected alpha level: α’= 0.0125.
4Bonferroni–Holm corrected alpha level: α’= 0.0167.
5Bonferroni–Holm corrected alpha level: α’= 0.025.
FIGURE 2 | Mean estimation errors for each experimental group; error bars show standard deviation.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 April 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 405
Fritz et al. Distorted time perception
p= 0.071. With regard to the experimental ‘awareness’ condition
(when participants were instructed to stay in the installation for
90 s), no signiﬁcant eﬀects on arousal, U = 492.000, p = 0.219,
perceived intoxication, U = 483.000, p= 0.873, ‘sinking into pic-
tures,’ U = 596.000, p = 0.916, feeling detached from one’s body,
U = 495.500, p = 0.1716, were found. A Kruskal–Wallis test did
not yield any diﬀerences on the duration of stay between groups,
χ2(3, n= 70)= 1.880, p= 0.598.
Discussion
Here, we demonstrate an inﬂuence of temporally manipulated
visual own-body representations on time perception and a num-
ber of other psychological parameters. A delayed video presen-
tation of one’s own body image resulted in a distorted absolute
time percept so that participants perceived durations of stay-
ing in the experimental setup either as much longer or much
shorter than in reality. This shows that a manipulation of body
schema by visual delay strongly corresponds to a modulation
of time percept, which was observed regardless of whether par-
ticipants had been instructed in the experimental paradigm to
stay a certain amount of time (90 s), or to stay as long as they
wanted. Such an association between changes in body schema
and time perception has previously been reported, for exam-
ple in schizophrenic patients who display a “natural” deviation
of body schema compared to healthy controls (Thakkar et al.,
2011). Furthermore, time perception is aﬀected in individuals
whose body schema was modulated by means of meditation
(Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013). Time perception is also dif-
ferent after the consumption of drugs, which often also leads
to changes in body schema (Edelmann and Terbuyken, 2002;
Atakan et al., 2012). The results of the current study are thus
in accord with previous concepts postulating an inﬂuence of
body schema on time perception, but it is the ﬁrst time that
visual delay of one’s own body has been used to manipulate time
perception.
Note that while in the current study wemanipulated the visual
representation of the own body (thus an aspect of body schema),
we more speciﬁcally also presented several visual representa-
tions of the own body at diﬀerent time points simultaneously.
This speciﬁc manipulation of body schema was thus also asso-
ciated with feeding in references of the immediate past into
working memory that is known to be crucial to time percep-
tion of durations in a seconds to minutes range (Buhusi and
Meck, 2005; Allman et al., 2014). We argue that this has a par-
allel in the acoustic domain, where references to the immediate
past through auditory-motor associations and operant condi-
tioning play a major role in musical improvisations. Here a
density of referential stimulation—diﬀerent to the current visual
experiment—would not be mediated by simultaneity (of several
video signals), but by the mostly repetitive organization of music.
Note, however, that no working memory related information
was being ‘actively’ manipulated in the task, i.e., participants
were for example not required to remember how their body
6Bonferroni–Holm corrected alpha level: α’ = 0.0125.
position was a few seconds ago, so the proposed link to work-
ing memory discussed here has yet to be considered rather
weak.
Furthermore, the manipulation of own-body representations
led to a number of other psychological outcomes that had pre-
viously been evoked with musical interventions (Rickard, 2004)
or by drug administration (Parrott et al., 2007). Participants
who were presented with their delayed body representations
reported signiﬁcantly higher perceived intoxication and arousal.
These eﬀects were (similarly to the observed eﬀects on time
perception) independent from participants being instructed to
stay a certain amount of time (90 s), or stay as long as they
wanted.
Additionally, the current study replicated the ﬁndings of pre-
vious research on human timing in the seconds to minutes range,
which showed a general tendency to overestimate time in the
seconds to minutes range (Wittmann et al., 2010). This ten-
dency was found in all experimental conditions in the current
experiment.
A limit of the current investigation is that eﬀects of the
time delays utilized are not systematically investigated. We just
compared delay on/oﬀ. For future studies it would, for exam-
ple, be interesting to identify which time delays work best for
corrupting the perception of time. Further, we did not inves-
tigate if a general eﬀect of non-delayed body representations
compared to no visual feedback of one’s body exists, another
question that might be addressed in future studies. Previous
research showed that attention can modulate perception of time
(Brown, 1985). Accordingly, it is possible that attentional pro-
cesses masked or contributed to eﬀects by modulation of body
schema on time perception, as we did not control for attentional
load in this study. However, it seems rather unlikely that atten-
tion diﬀered substantially between delay vs. non-delay groups
because besides eﬀects of group on time estimates, we also found
eﬀects of delay condition on outcomes completely unrelated to
attentional processes, such as arousal or perceived intoxication.
Previous research also reported a greater variability in time esti-
mation tasks in individuals with an altered body schema, i.e.,
schizophrenic patients (Bolbecker et al., 2014). Due to the fact
that we did only employ an in-between study design, we could not
test for this directly in the current study. Nonetheless, descriptive
diﬀerences in standard deviation between experimental groups
may point to an eﬀect of manipulation of body schema on
time estimation performance variability. It would be interest-
ing to focus more on this correlation of time perception and
body schema in future work. In addition, it would be interesting
to test the eﬀects of delayed video representations over diﬀer-
ent durations in future studies, given that in the current study
we only tested target durations of 90 s in the time awareness
conditions.
In conclusion, we here report a novel method to modify the
perception of time by modifying body schema through delayed
video representations of the own body. In addition to eﬀects
on time perception, we furthermore report eﬀects on perceived
arousal and intoxication. We discuss possible parallels to the
functioning of music in the acoustic domain with respect to
presenting references to the immediate past.
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